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INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE
ARMED CONFLICTS IN EL SALVADOR AND
NICARAGUA
Robert Kogod Goldman*
INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1980s, forces opposed to the governments in El Sal-
vador and Nicaragua have engaged in armed hostilities against those
governments. Under both their domestic laws and international law, the
Salvadoran and Nicaraguan governments have the right to use military
force to defend themselves from violent overthrow. However, applicable
laws and customs of war, i.e., international humanitarian law, impose
normative restraints on the conduct of hostilities by the warring parties
to these conflicts.
The purpose of this article is to identify and analyze the interna-
tional humanitarian law regimes applicable to these ongoing Central
American conflicts. Because the humanitarian law rules governing an
international armed conflict vary significantly from the rules governing
a non-international conflict, proper characterizations of the hostilities
in El Salvador and Nicaragua are necessary to determine the applica-
ble law. This article, after explaining the legal and factual reasons for
these requisite characterizations, analyzes the key legal restraints on
the choice of means and methods of combat available to the warring
parties. It also identifies the protections that the parties are obliged to
accord the civilian population and enemy combatants. The article fo-
cuses in particular on the applicable rules regulating the use of land
mines, a major cause of civilian casualties in El Salvador and Nicara-
gua during the past four years.1 Based on an examination of the rele-
vant law, the article then identifies practices that the warring parties
* Professor of Law and Louis C. James Scholar, Washington College of Law, The
American University. Parts of this article incorporate materials written by the author
that have been published in the following Reports of Americas Watch: Protection of
the Weak and Unarmed: The Dispute Over Counting Human Rights Violations in El
Salvador (Feb. 1984); Violations of the Laws of Wars by Both Sides in Nicaragua.
1981-85 (Mar. 1985); Land Mines in El Salvador and Nicaragua the Civilian Toll(Dec. 1986). The author is indebted to the late Waldemar A. Solf for reading and
offering helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. The author is also in-
debted to his Dean's Fellow, Peter Constantine, for his assistance in editing this article.
1. See infra note 70 (summarizing the use of land mines and similar devices in El
Salvador and Nicaragua).
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can legitimately employ, as well as other practices that violate the laws
and customs of war.
I. EL SALVADOR AND NICARAGUA: CASES OF NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS
Exercising their right under international law, the governments of El
Salvador and Nicaragua have requested and received war materiel and
military advisors from friendly states to help them fight dissident
forces, namely the FMLN rebels in El Salvador 2 and the contra insur-
gents (contras) in Nicaragua.3 For their part, the contras have received
weapons, military training, and financial assistance primarily from the
United States. In addition, Honduras and Costa Rica, although to a
lesser extent in the past, have provided logistical support to the contras.
The Honduran government permits the contras to establish and main-
tain bases and training camps within its territory from which the con-
tras launch military operations and resupply their forces already in
Nicaragua. Unlike the contras, FMLN forces operate exclusively
within Salvadoran territory and have received war materiel from Cuba,
the Soviet Union, and other Warsaw Pact members, as well as some
logistical support from Nicaragua. Although these circumstances, from
a purely political perspective, have unquestionably brought an interna-
tional dimension to the hostilities in both El Salvador and Nicaragua,
they do not make either conflict an international, i.e., interstate, one
under international humanitarian law."
2. The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) is the guerrilla or-
ganization that was formed in October 1980. It has links with the Democratic Revolu-
tionary Front (FDR), the nonmilitary, political arm of the revolutionary opposition in
El Salvador.
3. The contras (counter-revolutionaries) comprise the following armed groups: Fu-
erzas Democrdticas Nicaragilenses (FDN) (National Democratic Forces), Alianza
Revolucionaria Democrdtica (ARDE) (Revolutionary Democratic Alliance), a coalition
formed in early 1982 between Movimiento Democritico Nicaragilense (MDN) (Nica-
raguan Democratic Movement) and the Frente Revolucionario Sandino (FRS)
(Sandino Revolutionary Front); and two groups representing the Miskito Indians, MIS-
URASATA and KISAN. The umbrella organization for most of these armed groups is
the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO).
4. The United States and Nicaraguan governments have made numerous public
statements that, if taken literally, would mean that both states presently regard them-
selves as parties to an international armed conflict involving other states in the region.
See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, paras. 20-21 (Merits Judgment of June 27). Nicaragua claimed in its
suit against the United States that the United States is using military force against it,
in violation of international law by inter alia, creating, training, arming, and financing
an army of over 10,000 armed bands, or contras, who, from bases supplied to them in
Honduras and Costa Rica, also in violation of international law, have attacked human
and economic targets in Nicaragua. Id. President Reagan, in his February 1985 State
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Under article 2 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, an
international armed conflict, by definition, must involve a declared war
at the very least, or, in its absence, any other armed conflict between
two or more states.5 The official commentary to the 1949 Conventions
broadly defines armed conflict as any difference between two states
leading to the intervention of armed forces.6 The requisite conditions
for an international armed conflict have not yet been satisfied in either
conflict because no state currently providing assistance to the warring
parties has either declared war against El Salvador or Nicaragua or
directly intervened with its armed forces on the side of either party to
of the Union Address, said United States aid to the contras was justified as a legiti-
mate "collective self-defense" measure under the charters of the United Nations and
the Organization of American States in response to Nicaragua's "armed attack," i.e.,
supplying weapons to Salvadoran rebels, against the lawful government of El Salvador.
The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress, 21
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 140, 146 (Feb. 7, 1985).
Under both positions, the parties to such an international armed conflict would not
be limited to the United States and Nicaragua, but would include El Salvador, Hondu-
ras, Cuba, and Costa Rica as well. Not surprisingly, neither the United States, Nicara-
gua, nor these other states have recognized the existence of such a conflict with its
ensuing legal consequences under international humanitarian law, namely the applica-
tion of the four Geneva Conventions and Protocol I to the conflict. Even in such an
event, however, the humanitarian law regime governing relations between the Nicara-
guan government and Nicaraguan contras would still be article 3 and the customary
international law rules applicable to non-international conflicts, discussed later in this
article. The I.C.J. found the conflict between the Nicaraguan government and the con-
tras to be non-international in character and governed by common article 3. Military
and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
para. 219 (merits judgement of June 27).
Similarly, if another state intervened with its armed forces in the Salvadoran con-
flict, common article 3, customary international law, and Protocol II, as discussed in-
fra, would continue to govern the legal relationship at least between the Salvadoran
government and the FMLN rebels. The introduction of another state's armed forces in
either Central American conflict would "internationalize" these non-international
armed conflicts. See also Gasser, Internationalized Non-International Armed Con-
flicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lebanon, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 145,
145-47 (1983) (discussing the legal issues posed by such interventions).
5. Article 2 common to the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 3116, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, at 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32 [First Geneva Convention];
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
3220, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, at 4, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86 [Second Geneva Convention]; Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Treatment to Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 3318, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, at 3, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 [Third Geneva
Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, at 3, 75 U.N.T.S.
287, 288 [Fourth Geneva Convention] [all four collectively hereinafter 1949 Geneva
Conventions].
6. COMMENTARY TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, GENEVA
CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND
SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 32 (J. Pictet ed. 1952).
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these conflicts. Accordingly, the present nature of the hostilities be-
tween government and dissident forces in both El Salvador and Nicara-
gua is that of a noninternational, i.e., internal, armed conflict.
Because these conflicts are of a noninternational nature, they are
governed by two sets of humanitarian law rules. First are those rules
set forth in article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions
(article 3), to which El Salvador and Nicaragua are state parties. Sec-
ond are those customary international law rules applicable to internal
armed conflicts. In the case of El Salvador, the warring parties are also
bound by Protocol II additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Pro-
tocol II).8 While not directly applicable to the Nicaraguan conflict,
7. 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 5, art. 3. Common article 3 states:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall
be bound to apply, as a minimum, to the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth, or wealth, or any
other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutila-
tion, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and de-
grading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civi-
lized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial hu-
manitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross,
may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict shall further endeavor to bring into force, by
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the pres-
ent Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal sta-
tus of the Parties to the conflict.
Id. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has stated that the provi-
sions of article 3 now possess the character of jus cogens, a peremptory norm of inter-
national law, and thus are binding on all authorities claiming to exist in international
law. Speech by Jacques Moreillon, Director for General Affairs and Directorate Mem-
ber, ICRC, Inter-American Seminar on State Security, Human Rights and Humanita-
rian Law, San Jose, Costa Rica (Sept. 1982); see also Military and Paramilitary Ac-
tivities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, Para. 220 (Merits
Judgement of June 27) (indicating that common article 3 reflects general principles of
humanitarian law or customary international law).
8. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),
[VOL. 2:539
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Protocol II does contain rules providing authoritative guidance on the
conduct of hostilities by the parties to that conflict. The Land Mines
Protocol,9 although expressly limited to interstate conflicts, is another
appropriate source of rules that should be used to measure the conduct
of the warring parties in both El Salvador and Nicaragua.
II. ARTICLE 3 OF THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS
A. ARTICLE 3's MATERIAL FIELD OF APPLICATION
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions is virtually a convention
within a convention.10 It imposes fixed legal obligations on the parties
to an internal conflict for the protection of persons not, or no longer,
taking an active part in the hostilities." Unlike human rights law,
which restrains violations inflicted only by a government and its agents,
the obligatory provisions of article 3 expressly bind both parties to the
conflict, i.e., government and dissident forces.1 2 Moreover, the obliga-
tion to apply article 3 is absolute for both parties and independent of
the obligation of the other party.1 3
Although article 3 automatically applies when a situation of internal
armed conflict 14 objectively exists, the International Committee of the
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex I and 11 (1977),
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II.
The ICRC has expressly recognized the applicability of Protocol II to the Salvadoran
conflict. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 29 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter ICRC ANNUAL REPORT 1983].
9. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restriction on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices (Protocol II), annexed to United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or
Restriction of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons: Final Act, app. C, opened for
signature Apr. 10, 1981, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.95/15 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M.
1523, 1529 (1980) [hereinafter Land Mines Protocol].
10. COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, GENEVA
CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND
SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD, supra note 6, at 48; see Junod, Additional
Protocol II: History and Scope, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 29, 30 (1983).
11. See 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 7 (providing the text of article 3).
12. Id. See generally Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol II and Its Relation to Com-
mon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Other Human Rights Instru-
ments, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 9, 12 (1983). The generic term "dissidents" is used in this
article to designate the party opposing governmental authorities in an internal conflict.
13. COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, GENEVA
CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND
SICK IN THE FIELD, supra note 6, at 51; see Junod, supra note 10, at 30.
14. Although the expression "an armed conflict of a non-international character" is
not defined in the Geneva Conventions, Pictet states that "[t]he conflicts referred to in
Article 3 are armed conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities-
conflicts, in short, which are in many respects similar to an international war, but take
place within the confines of a single country." COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CON-
VENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT
1987]
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Red Cross (ICRC) is not legally empowered to compel the warring
parties to acknowledge the article's applicability. 8 Thus, despite the
fact that both the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan governments have per-
mitted the ICRC to establish permanent delegations in their territory,
neither government has publicly recognized the existence of an internal
armed conflict as defined in article 3.1 The fact that both governments
allow the ICRC access to captured dissidents and to engage in civilian
relief operations in combat zones, where ICRC delegates have come
into contact with dissident forces, 7 however, suggests that both govern-
ments tacitly acknowledge the existence of another internal party to
these conflicts.
Significantly, article 3 is the only provision of the four Geneva Con-
ventions that directly applies to internal armed conflicts. The parties to
such a conflict have no legal obligation to implement, enforce, or com-
ply with the highly developed protections of the other articles of the
Conventions that apply solely to an international armed conflict. 8
OF PRISONERS OF WAR 37 (J. Pictet ed. 1960). This concept of armed conflict excludes
situations of internal disturbance and tensions characterized by sporadic acts of vio-
lence, riots, and widespread arrests. The legal regime governing such internal situations
is the particular country's domestic law and, where applicable, international human
rights law.
In situations of internal disturbances and tension, the ICRC has a "right of initia-
tive" to offer its services to the government not based on the Geneva Conventions but
based on its own statutes. For a detailed discussion of the need for new rules to govern
situations of internal disturbances see Meron, Editorial Comment, Towards a Humani-
tarian Declaration on Internal Strife, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 859, 860-68 (1984); Meron,
On the Inadequate Reach of Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the Need for
a New Instrument, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 589 (1984).
15. See COMMENTARY TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, GE-
NEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED
AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD, supra note 6, at 51-52 (indicating that
only the parties to the conflict are obliged to apply article 3).
16. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 36-41 (1987)
[hereinafter ICRC ANNUAL REPORT 1986] (discussing ICRC activities in El Salvador
and Nicaragua).
17. id.
18. See supra note 7 (providing the text of article 3); COMMENTARY ON THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, supra note 14, at 37. The sole provision on imple-
mentation in article 3 provides only that the ICRC may offer its services to the parties
to the conflict, but the parties are not legally required to accept such an offer. In con-
trast, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol I, which govern international armed
conflicts, have mandatory provisions for the enforcement and implementation of their
norms. These include supervision by protecting powers or an impartial humanitarian
body, such as the ICRC, state responsibility for breaches, and individual responsibility
for "grave breaches" that are made universal crimes within the jurisdiction of all par-
ties to these Conventions and Protocol I. First Geneva Convention, supra note 5, arts.
6-11, 45-54; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 5, arts. 6-11, 46-53; Third Geneva
Convention, supra note 5, arts. 7-12, 142-49; see also Protocol Additional to the Ge-
CENTRAL AM. ARMED CONFLICTS
There are only two situations in which the Geneva Conventions could
apply to the conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua. The first situation
would arise if the government(s) recognized the belligerency of the dis-
sidents. The second situation would arise if the government(s) and dis-
sidents reached a special agreement to apply the Conventions under
article 3, arrived at either directly or by similar declarations through
the ICRC, or by unilateral declaration of the government(s).19 Since
neither government has done this, the warring parties in both countries
are not legally required to apply rules contained in the Geneva Conven-
tions relevant to the combatants's privilege and prisoners of war status.
Under the Conventions and customary international law governing in-
ternational armed conflicts, prisoner of war status flows directly from
the combatants's privilege. A noted legal scholar writes that in essence
"the combatants's privilege is a license to kill, maim, or kidnap enemy
combatants; destroy military objectives; and cause unavoidable civilian
casualties." 20 This privilege immunizes members of the armed forces
from criminal prosecution by their captors for their violent acts that do
not transgress the laws of war, but that might otherwise be crimes
under domestic law.21
In an internal armed conflict, however, a government is not obliged
to accord its armed opponents prisoner of war status because dissidents
do not have the combatants's privilege.22 Moreover, article 3 in no way
neva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), arts. 5-7, 80-9 1, opened for signature Dec.
12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex 1, 11 (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391
(1977) [hereinafter Protocol I].
In a noninternational armed conflict, violations of mandatory provisions in common
article 3 are subject to enforcement under domestic law. If the state where the conflict
occurs is also a party to a human rights treaty, the implementing procedures of the
treaty can be used to redress violations of article 3, to the extent that the provisions in
articles 3 are coextensive with rights guaranteed by the treaty. See generally Schindler,
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Interrelationship of the Laws, 31 AMi. U.L.
REV. 936 (1982); Veuthey, Implementation and Enforcement of Humanitarian Law
and Human Rights Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts: The Role of the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross, 33 Am. U.L. REv. 83 (1983).
19. See Veuthey, supra note 18, at 92-93 (discussing some special agreements).
20. Solf, (Commentator on the subject of Non-International Armed Conflicts), in
The American Red Cross - Washington College of Law Conference: International Hu-
manitarian Law, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 927, 928 (1982); M. BOTHE, K. PARTSCH, & W.
SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFucTs: COMMENTARY ON THE Two
1977 PROTOcoLs ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 243 (1982)
[hereinafter NEw RULES].
21. The combatants's privilege does not extend to war crimes. Soilf, supra note 20,
at 928.
22. Solf, The Status of Combatants in Non-International Armed Conflicts Under
Domestic Law and Transnational Practice, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 53, 59 (1983). Soilf
states:
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precludes a government from punishing these persons for the commis-
sion of crimes under its domestic laws.23 Thus, the Salvadoran and Nic-
araguan governments can try captured guerrillas who kill government
soldiers for murder, treason, sedition, and other violent acts. Such trials
must be conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in article
3 and, in the case of El Salvador, with the provisions of article 6 of
Protocol 11.24 To ensure that the application of humanitarian guaran-
tees in article 3 by the government is not legally construed as recogni-
Governments, particularly those that may be affected by an emerging dissident
or separatist movement, are unwilling to concur in any rule of international law
that, in effect, would repeal their treason laws and confer on their domestic ene-
mies a license to kill, maim, or kidnap security personnel and destroy security
installations subject only to honorable detention as prisoners of war until the
conclusion of the internal armed conflict.
Id.
23. COMMENTARY TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, supra note 14, at
40; see Solf, supra note 22, at 58-59 (indicating that states can often punish persons
for security offenses, treason, or common crimes).
24. See supra note 7 (providing the text of article 3); Protocol II, supra note 8, art.
6. Article 6 states:
1. This Article applies to the prosecution and punishment of criminal offenses
related to the armed conflict.
2. No sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a person
found guilty of an offence except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a court
offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality. In particular:
(a)the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of
the particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall afford the accused
before and during his trial all necessary rights and means of defence;
(b) no one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual
penal responsibility;
(c) no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under the law, at the time
when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which
was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the
commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a
lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby;
(d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proven guilty
according to law;
(e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his
presence;
(f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.
3. A convicted person shall be advised on conviction of his judicial and other
remedies and of the time-limits within which they may be exercised.
4. The death penalty shall not be pronounced on persons who were under the age
of eighteen years at the time of the offence and shall not be carried out on preg-
nant women or mothers of young children.
5. At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the
broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict,
or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict,
whether they are interned or detained.
[VOL. 2:539
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tion of the dissidents's belligerence, the article unequivocally states that
application of its provisions does not affect the legal status of the par-
ties to the conflict.
B. PROTECTION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION UNDER ARTICLE 3
Unlike international treaty law governing international armed con-
flicts, article 3 contains no rules regulating the means and methods of
warfare. In addition, the terms "civilian" and "combatant" do not ap-
pear in any of the provisions of article 3. Although article 3 does not
provide explicit protection for the civilian population from attacks or
their effects, its prohibition of "violence to life and person" against
"persons taking no active part in the hostilities" may be broad enough
to encompass attacks against civilians in territory controlled by an ad-
verse party in an internal armed conflict. The primary purpose of arti-
cle 3, however, is to absolutely ensure humane treatment of those per-
sons who do not or no longer actively participate in the hostilities when
they are in the power of a party to the internal conflict. Such persons
are entitled to humane treatment without adverse distinction.
With regard to the conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua, persons
protected by article 3 include members of both government and dissi-
dent forces who surrender, are found wounded, sick, or unarmed, or are
otherwise captured by the other side. Individual civilians are similarly
entitled to the guarantees contained in article 3 when they are captured
by or subjected to the power of a warring party, even if they had
fought for the opposing party, or indirectly participated in the hostili-
ties by providing either party with food or other logistical support.
Under these circumstances, if these persons die as a result of execution
or torture inflicted by a party to the conflict, their deaths are tanta-
mount to homicide.
III. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS
Although article 3 does not by its terms prohibit attacks against the
civilian population in noninternational armed conflicts, such attacks are
prohibited by the customary laws of armed conflict. United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 2444, Respect for Human Rights in
Armed Conflicts (United Nations Resolution 2444) ,21 adopted by
25. G.A. Res. 2444, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 164, U.N. Doc. A/7433
(1968) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 2444].
1987]
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unanimous vote on December 19, 1969,26 expressly recognized this cus-
tomary principle of civilian immunity and its complementary principle
requiring the warring parties to distinguish civilians from combatants
at all times. The preamble to this resolution clearly states that these
fundamental humanitarian law principles apply "in all armed con-
flicts," meaning both international and internal armed conflicts.2 7 Fur-
thermore, the ICRC has long regarded these principles as basic rules of
the laws of war that apply in all armed conflicts. 28 The United States
government also has expressly recognized these principles as declara-
tory of existing customary international law.2" These principles, there-
fore, constitute legal obligations for all the parties to the internal hostil-
ities in El Salvador and Nicaragua.
IV. PROTOCOL II AND ITS APPLICATION TO INTERNAL
ARMED CONFLICTS
A. THE PROTOCOL'S MATERIAL FIELD OF APPLICATION
Apart from customary international law, the principal source of rules
26. See id. at 29 (providing the numerical voting record of G.A. Res. 2444).
27. Id. art. 1. This resolution affirms, inter alia:
[T]he following principles for observance by all governmental and other authori-
ties responsible for action in armed conflicts:
(a) That the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited;
(b) That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the
civilian population as such;
(c) That distinction must be made at all time between persons taking part in the
hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be
spared as much as possible .
Id.
28. See id. art. 1 (noting that the ICRC has recognized these principles since it
first presented them in 1965 at the Twentieth International Conference of the Red
Cross).
29. Letter from the General Counsel, United States Department of Defense to Sen-
ator Edward Kennedy (Sept. 22, 1968), reprinted in Rovine, Contemporary Practice of
the United States Relating to International Law, 67 Am,. J. INT'L L. 118, 122-25
(1973). The Armed Forces of the United States expressly recognizes the binding na-
ture of the principle of civilian immunity from direct attack. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE
ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE para. 25, at 16 (1956 &
Supp. 1976) [hereinafter 1956 FIELD MANUAL 27-10] (indicating that "it is a gener-
ally recognized rule of international law that civilians must not be made the object of
attack directed exclusively against them"); U.S. DEP'T OF WAR, FIELD MANUAL 27-10,
RULES OF LAND WARFARE para. 19, at 6 (1940 & Supp. 1944) [hereinafter 1940
FIELD MANUAL 27-10] (noting that "It is now universally recognized that hostilities
are restricted to the armed forces of belligerents"); U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW - THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS,
AFP 110-31 para. 5-3, at 5-7 (1976) [hereinafter U.S. AIR FORCE PAMPHLET] (outlin-
ing the rules that are observed to protect civilians against "dangers arising from mili-
tary operations").
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governing the conduct of hostilities for the protection of victims in in-
ternal armed conflicts is Protocol 11.30 Article 1, paragraph 1 of Proto-
col II limits that instrument's application to a noninternational armed
conflict, "which takes place in the territory of a High Contracting
Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other or-
ganized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this
Protocol."''
l
Protocol II develops and supplements article 3 without modifying
that article's existing conditions of application. Thus, in those conflicts
satisfying the conditions for its application, Protocol II applies cumula-
tively and simultaneously with article 3 because the scope of Protocol
II is included in the broader scope of article 3. Protocol II's threshold
of application, however, is both different from and clearly above that of
article 3.32 Protocol II introduces objective qualifications not found in
article 3, such as the requirements that a state party's armed forces
must participate in the conflict and that dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups must exercise control over a part of its terri-
tory. Moreover, as stated in the Commentary on the Two 1977 Proto-
cols (New Rules), "the qualifications of the armed conflict contained
in the last part of the sentence [Art. 1 para. 1] beginning with 'which,
under responsible command,' are principally designed to limit the ap-
plication of Protocol II to serious cases of rebellions of 'other organized
armed groups.' ,,33 Thus, the objective conditions that must be satisfied
to trigger Protocol II's application contemplate a situation of civil war
essentially comparable to a state of belligerency under customary inter-
national law.
B. PROTOCOL II's APPLICATION TO THE SALVADORAN CONFLICT
Despite the Salvadoran government's reluctance to officially recog-
30. Protocol II, supra note 8.
31. Id. art. 1(1). Article 1(2) also expressly excludes from Protocol Hl's material
field of application "situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, iso-
lated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being
armed conflicts." Id. Such situations are similarly excluded from the scope of article 3
for various reasons previously stated. See supra note 7 (stating the reasons for exclud-
ing certain situations from the scope of article 3).
32. See Junod, supra note 10, at 35-38 (discussing the scope of Protocol 11 in rela-
tion to article 3); NEw RULES, supra note 20, at 623 (comparing Protocol I1 with
article 3).
33. NEw RULES, supra note 20, at 627.
1987]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
nize the applicability of Protocol 11,11 it is apparent that the hostilities
there have met the Protocol's threshold for some time.35 The FMLN
rebels have controlled and exercised considerable influence over the ci-
vilian population in the northern Morazan, northeast Chalatenango,
eastern Usulatan, northern San Miguel, and areas of San Salvador,
constituting substantial parts of five of the country's fourteen depart-
ments. The rebels' control over these areas has enabled them to engage
in sustained military operations that they have undertaken in a system-
atic, coordinated manner. 36 It should be noted that full-fledged field
battles are not necessary to make Protocol II applicable.
The FMLN also has pledged to the ICRC to respect international
humanitarian law, particularly regarding the treatment of captured
persons. 37 In addition to permitting the ICRC to undertake civilian re-
lief activities, the FMLN has allowed ICRC delegates to occasionally
visit captured combatants and civilian detainees and has released, in
the past, some of these persons to the ICRC.38 These actions indicate
that the rebels are capable of applying the Protocol. Importantly, the
ICRC expressly recognized the applicability of Protocol II to the Sal-
vadoran conflict in its 1983 Annual Report.39
C. PROTOCOL II's RELEVANCE TO THE NICARAGUAN CONFLICT
Nicaragua has signed, but not ratified, Protocol II. Therefore, the
34. AMERICAS WATCH, THE CIVILIAN TOLL, 1986-1987, NINTH SUPPLEMENT TO
THE REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR 26 (Aug. 30, 1987) [hereinafter
THE CIVILIAN TOLL]. The authors of The Civilian Toll state, "[I1t appears that the
government of El Salvador, or at least important sectors of the government, have recog-
nized the applicability of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol II ... to the war in El
Salvador." Id. The Salvadoran Armed Forces, however, continued to commit serious
human rights and law of war abuses in 1986 and 1987. Id.
35. See ICRC ANNUAL REPORT 1983, supra note 8, at 37 (indicating that the
ICRC recognizes that the hostilities in El Salvador satisfy the threshold in Protocol II).
36. See generally AMERICAS WATCH AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR, A REPORT TO THE BOARD OF THE
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 1-52 (1982) (describing rebel activities in El Salva-
dor); AMERICAS WATCH AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION As BAD As
EVER: A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR 7-52 (4th Supp., Jan. 31,
1984); THE CIVILIAN TOLL, supra note 34; ORG. OF AMER. STATES, REPORT ON THE
SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR 32-164, OEA/ser. L/V/I 1.46, doc.
23 rev. 1 (17 November 1978).
37. See ICRC ANNUAL REPORT 1983, supra note 8, at 29 (noting that the FMLN
has pledged to respect international humanitarian law). But see THE CIVILIAN TOLL,
supra note 34, at 121-54 (noting that although the FMLN has recognized the Proto-
col's applicability to the conflict in El Salvador, it has committed serious violations of
the laws of war); THE CIVILIAN TOLL, supra note 34 (listing reports on humans rights
abuses in El Salvador).
38. ICRC ANNUAL REPORT 1986, supra note 16, at 37-38.
39. Id.
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terms of that instrument do not bind either the Sandinista government
or the contras. Even if Nicaragua had ratified Protocol II, the present
intensity of hostilities there falls significantly below the Protocol's high
threshold. Although the contras have declared their adherence to inter-
national humanitarian law,40 have engaged government forces primar-
ily in parts of Zelaya, Jinotega, Matagalpa, Boaco, and Chontales
provinces, and continue to maintain an organized command structure,
they have been unable to control effectively these or other parts of Nic-
araguan territory so as to enable them to carry out sustained and con-
certed military operations in that country.'1 Nevertheless, Protocol II is
relevant to the conflict in Nicaragua.
The preamble of the Protocol contains a de Martens Clause that
states "in cases not covered by the law in force, the human person re-
mains under the protection of the principles of humanity, and the dic-
tates of public conscience.' 2 The principle of humanity, which both
complements and inherently limits the doctrine of military necessity,
forbids direct attacks against the civilian population and those mea-
sures of violence that cause unnecessary suffering.'3 The deliberate al-
lusion in Protocol II to the principle of humanity reaffirms the rele-
vance in internal armed conflicts of the customary law principle of
civilian immunity and the principle of distinction enshrined in United
Nations Resolution 2444.
The implicit and explicit protection from direct attack accorded the
40. Unpublished letter from Azunca Ferrey and Adolfo Calero, Directors of the
Resistencia Nicaragiense to Orville H. Shell, Chairman of Americas Watch and
Aryeh Neier, Vice-Chairman of Americas Watch, (Jan. 26, 1988) (copy of letter avail-
able from article author). These contra leaders state that in July of 1984 they advised
the President of the ICRC in Geneva of their acceptance of the applicability of interna-
tional humanitarian law to the conflict in Nicaragua and their commitment to observe
the same. Id.
41. See generally AMERICAS WATCH, VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR BY BOTH
SIDES IN NICARAGUA 1981-1985 (1985) (describing contra activity in Nicaragua);
AMERICAS WATCH, VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR BY BOTH SIDES IN NICARAGUA
1981-1985 (1st Supp., June 1985); AMERICAS WATCH, HUMANRIGHTS IN NICARAGUA
1985-1986 (1986).
42. Protocol II, supra note 8, preamble. This clause is named after Fyodor de Mar-
tens, the Russian jurist and diplomat who drafted the preambles to the Hague Conven-
tions No. II of 1855 and No. IV of 1907 which codified much of the law of war. De
Martens's formulation was intended to obviate the notion that any means or methods of
warfare not expressly prohibited by treaty was permissible. The de Martens Clause
thus affirms that customary laws of war remain in full force, except to the extent modi-
fied by treaty. Formulations similar to the original de Martens Clause appear in the
four 1949 Geneva Conventions, Protocol I, and the United Nations Weapons
Convention.
43. U.S. AIR FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 29, para. 1-3(2), at 1-6; see also 1940
FIELD MANUAL 27-10, supra note 29, para. 4(b), at 2 (providing a similar definition
for the principle of humanity).
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civilian population, the effects of warfare under article 3, and these
customary international law principles would be illusory guarantees
without appropriate standards defining and distinguishing civilians and
civilian objects from combatants and military objectives in internal
armed conflicts. Protocol II contains various rules that provide authori-
tative guidance for the protection of the civilian population in the con-
duct of military operations. The same rules can provide interpretive
standards for similar purposes in internal armed conflicts not directly
governed by Protocol II, such as the hostilities in Nicaragua. In addi-
tion, many of the rules contained in Protocol I additional to the 1949
Geneva Conventions (Protocol I), which apply only to international
armed conflicts and which are not generally replicated in Protocol II,
also provide guidance for interpreting the substantive content of the
similar, but less detailed, provisions in Protocol II.
D. CLASSIFICATION OF CIVILIANS AND THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS
The basic provision in Protocol II relating to civilian immunity is
article 13. 44 This article merely refers to "individual civilians" and "ci-
vilian population" without explaining the meaning of these terms. Arti-
cle 50 of Protocol I, however, defines the term "civilian population" as
comprising "all persons who are civilians"" and defines a "civilian"
44. Protocol II, supra note 8, art. 13. Article 13 states:
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection
against the dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this pro-
tection, the following rules shall be observed in all circumstances.
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the
object of attack. Acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population, are prohibited.
3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Part, unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities.
Id.
45. Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 50(1) (defining a civilian as "any person who
does not belong to one of the categories referred to in article 4(A)(1), (2), (3), and (6)
of the Third Convention and in article 13 of this Protocol). Article 4(A)(1), (2), (3),
and (6) of the Third Geneva Convention includes persons who are (1) members of the
armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps
forming part of such armed forces; (2) members of other militias and members of
volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a
Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this terri-
tory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organ-
ized resistance movements, fulfill certain conditions; (3) members of regular armed
forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the
detaining power; and (4) inhabitants of a nonoccupied territory, who on the approach
of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having
had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly
and respect the laws and customs of war. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art.
[VOL. 2:539
CENTRAL AM. ARMED CONFLICTS
negatively as anyone who is not a member of the armed forces or of an
organized armed group of a party to the conflict. These definitions are
also relevant for distinguishing civilians from combatants in internal
armed conflicts governed by Protocol II and article 3.
Unlike article 43 of Protocol I, article 13 of Protocol II also does not
explicitly define the term "combatants." Protocol II, however, contains
the basic elements of the concept of armed forces in its allusion to the
"armed forces of the High Contracting party" and to "dissident armed
forces or other organized armed groups ...under responsible com-
mand." The authors of New Rules state that "inferentially these terms
recognize the essential conditions prescribed under art. 43 of Protocol I:
that the armed forces be linked to one of the parties to the conflict; that
they be organized; and that they be under responsible command.""
They significantly conclude that "[it thus follows that civilians are all
persons who are not members of organizations meeting these qualifica-
tions."4 Accordingly, the civilian population comprises all other per-
sons who do not actively participate in the hostilities, which means par-
ticipating in an attack that the party intends to cause physical harm to
enemy personnel or objects. In addition, the authors of the New Rules
indicate that the term "civilian" also includes the following:
Persons directly linked to the armed forces, including those who accompany
the armed forces without being members thereof, such as civilian members of
military aircraft crews, supply contractors, members of labour units, or of ser-
vices responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, members of the crew of the
merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft employed in the transportation of
military personnel, material or supplies ....
Civilians employed in the production, distribution and storage of munitions of
war, and
Civilians who are taking, or have taken, part in hostilities without combatant
status. These persons, however, lose their [immunity from attack) while they are
taking a direct part in hostilities.'
Article 50 of Protocol I also provides that "the presence within the
civilian population of individuals who do not come within the definition
4(A)(1), (2), (3), (6).
Article 43 of Protocol I, on the other hand, defines armed forces of a party as con-
sisting of "all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command
responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is repre-
sented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse party. Such
armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system .... " Protocol I.
supra note 18, art. 43(1).
46. NEw RULES, supra note 20, at 672.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 293-94.
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of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character."",
The point of this provision, according to the New Rules, is that "[t]he
presence of a small number of off-duty combatants, or even of some
engaged in the transaction of business for the armed forces within a
community of civilians would not subject that community to attack."'0
Such a community, therefore, is similarly immune from direct attack.
E. DESIGNATION OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES
The definition of the term "military objective" in Protocol I inferen-
tially applies to that term's usage in Protocol II. Article 52(2) of Proto-
col I defines military objectives only as they relate to objects or targets,
rather than to personnel.51 To constitute a legitimate military objective,
the object or target, selected by its nature, location, purpose, or use,
must contribute effectively to the enemy's military capability or activ-
ity, and its total or partial destruction or neutralization must offer a
definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time. Ex-
cept for certain objects given special immunity, such as dykes and
dams, Protocol I does not delineate specific categories of property or
persons as military objectives.
It is clear, however, that legitimate military objectives do include en-
emy combatants, as well as their weapons, convoys, installations, and
supplies. In addition, the New Rules states that "an object generally
used for civilian purposes, such as a dwelling, a bus, a fleet of taxicabs,
or a civilian airfield or railroad siding, can become a military objective
if its location or use meets both of the criteria set forth in article 52."52
For example, a defending party may organize an entire town or village
as part of its defensive position, thereby making it a "defended local-
ity."53 The town or village thus constitutes a legitimate target. The ci-
vilians remaining in that locale, however, would retain the benefits of
the rule of proportionality as it applies to collateral civilian casualties.5'
Moreover, the New Rules points out that the criterion requiring mili-
tary objectives to make an effective contribution to military action does
not necessarily require their direct connection with combat opera-
tions.55 A civilian object may become a military objective and lose its
immunity from deliberate attack through use that only indirectly re-
49. Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 50(3).
50. NEw RULES, supra note 20, at 296.
51. Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 52(2).
52. NEw RULES, supra note 20, at 306-07.
53. Id. at 307.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 324.
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lates to combat action, but that nonetheless provides an effective contri-
bution to the military aspect of a party's overall war effort.60 Accord-
ingly, industries or crops, whether publicly or privately owned, that are
of fundamental importance for conducting the armed conflict are legiti-
mate military targets. The New Rules notes, for example, that the de-
struction by Union forces of raw cotton in the South during the United
States Civil War was justifiable. Raw cotton was a military target not
because it had any value as an implement of war, but because it was
the chief export of the Confederacy and thus the ultimate means of
funding Confederate weapons and military supplies.0 7
F. DESIGNATION OF CIVILIAN OBJECTS
The definition of the term "civilian objects" in article 52(1) of Proto-
col 158 should be accorded similar meaning for purposes of Protocol II.
Article 52(1) negatively defines civilian objects as all objects that are
not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2 of that same article,
which sets forth the twofold test for military objectives. Therefore, arti-
cle 52 implicitly characterizes all objects as civilian, unless they make
an effective contribution to the enemy's military action and unless de-
stroying, capturing, or neutralizing them offers a definite military ad-
vantage in the circumstances.
In doubtful situations, article 52 creates a presumption that objects
normally dedicated to civilian use, such as churches, houses, or schools,
are not employed to contribute effectively to military action."" This pre-
sumption attaches only to objects that ordinarily have no significant
military use or purpose. For example, this presumption would not in-
clude objects that constitute legitimate military targets under the crite-
ria established in article 52, such as transportation and communication
systems.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 329 n.15.
58. Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 52(1). Article 52(1) states:
Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects
are all objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2.
Id.
59. Id. art. 52(3). Article 52(3) states:
In case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian pur-
poses, such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being
used to make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed
not to be so used.
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G. PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN OBJECTS FROM
INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS UNDER PROTOCOL II
Although article 13 of Protocol II accords the civilian population and
individual civilians general protection against attack, it does not ex-
pressly provide them or civilian objects express protection against indis-
criminate or disproportionate attacks. The New Rules indicates, how-
ever, that "the concept of general protection is broad enough to cover
protections which flow as necessary inferences from other provisions of
Protocol II.'"60 In addition, the detailed rules in Protocol I designed to
protect civilians and civilian objects from such attacks provide relevant
guidance for interpreting the extent of similar protection for these per-
sons and objects under Protocol II."1
For example, article 51(4) of Protocol I expressly protects the civil-
ian population from indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks.62 The
article prohibits attacks that are not directed at specific military objec-
tives or that employ a method or means of combat that a party cannot
direct at a specific military objective. Thus, the article prohibits the
parties from attacking military objectives and civilians or civilian ob-
60. NEw RULES, supra note 20, at 676.
61. Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 51(1), (2). Article 51(1) and (2) states:
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection
against dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this protection,
the following rules, which are additional to other applicable rules of international
law, shall be observed in all circumstances.
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the
object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.
Id.
62. Id. art. 51 paras. 4, 5. Article 51(4) and (5) states:
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
a. those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
b. those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed
at a specific military objective; or
c. those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which can-
not be limited as required by this Protocol;
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives
and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.
5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as
indiscriminate:
a. an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a
single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military
objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar con-
centration of civilians or civilian objects; and
b. an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.
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jects without distinction.
Article 51(5)(a) characterizes an attack as indiscriminate when it
treats a number of clearly separate and distinct military objectives lo-
cated in a city, town, village, or other area containing a concentration
of civilians or civilian objects as a single military objective. An assault
on a single military objective within that locale, on the other hand,
would not constitute an unlawful indiscriminate attack. An attack on a
populated area in order to destroy several military objectives that a
party could have attacked separately, however, is indiscriminate. In ad-
dition, article 51(5)(b) also characterizes as indiscriminate an attack
that might cause civilian casualties and damage disproportionate to the
"concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."
The legitimacy of a target, however, does not provide unlimited li-
cense to attack it. The prohibitions on indiscriminate and dispropor-
tionate attacks affecting civilians limit the methods of attacking legiti-
mate military targets located in the midst of a high concentration of
civilian population. For example, an attack on an entire farm or coop-
erative in order to destroy a coffee-drying facility that could be sepa-
rately attacked would be indiscriminate. The use of "blind" weapons
can also constitute an indiscriminate attack.83
The New Rules also indicates that the absence of an explicit prohibi-
tion against indiscriminate attacks in article 13 is due merely to the
simplification of the text of the article." It argues, therefore, that "at-
tacks against densely populated places which are not directed at mili-
tary objectives, those which cannot be so directed, and the area bom-
bardments prohibited by para. 5(a) of Art. 51 [Protocol I] are
inferentially included within the prohibition against making the civilian
population the object of attack."6 5 The "principle of humanity," ex-
pressly stated in the preamble of Protocol II, also implicitly prohibits
disproportionate or indiscriminate attacks against the civilian popula-
tion in a non-international armed conflict.
V. THE LAND MINES PROTOCOL
The principal source of international law rules governing the use of
land mines and comparable explosive devices is the Land Mines Proto-
col,66 annexed to the 1981 United Nations Conference on Prohibitions
or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May
63. NEw RULES, supra note 20, at 324.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Land Mines Protocol, supra note 9.
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be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious and to Have Indiscriminate Ef-
fects (United Nations Convention).6 Article 1 of the United Nations
Convention, however, states that the Land Mines Protocol applies only
to international armed conflicts and to a limited class of wars of na-
tional liberation. 8 El Salvador and Nicaragua are not legally bound by
these instruments because neither state has ratified them.69 Assuming,
however, that both states had done so, the provisions of these instru-
ments still would not directly apply as treaty obligations because
neither conflict meets the threshold requirements of article 1 of the
United Nations Convention.
The fact that the Land Mines Protocol is not directly binding on El
Salvador and Nicaragua does not mean, however, that this instrument's
authoritative rules are inappropriate to the conduct of military opera-
tions by the parties to the conflicts in both countries. ° In this regard,
67. United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restriction of Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons: Final Act, opened for signature Apr. 10, 1981, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.95/15 (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1523 (1980) [hereinafter U.N. Conven-
tion]. The Convention and its three Protocols entered into force on December 2, 1983.
The Convention is an "umbrella" treaty to which are attached three optional protocol
agreements, each containing specific limitations on the use of particular conventional
weapons. Id. In addition to the Land Mines Protocol, the Convention incorporates the
Protocol on Non-detectable Fragments (Protocol I) and the Protocol on Prohibitions or
Restriction on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III). Id. Under this structure,
the provisions of the Convention apply to all three protocols. At the time a state ratifies
or accepts the Convention, it must indicate its consent to become bound by at least two
of these Protocols. Id. art. 4(3). Thereafter, the state can become a party to the other
Protocol, if it so consents. Id. art. 4(4).
68. Id. art. 1.
69. See Recent Actions Regarding Treaties to Which the United States is not a
Party, 20 I.L.M. 795 (1981) (noting that Nicaragua did, however, sign the United
Nations Convention on May 20, 1981).
70. See THE CIVILIAN TOLL, supra note 34, 106-07 (summarizing the use of land
mines and other explosive devices in El Salvador). See generally AMERICAS WATCH,
LAND MINES IN EL SALVADOR AND NICARAGUA, THE CIVILIAN VICTIMS (Dec. 1986)
[hereinafter LAND MINES] (detailing the use of land mines and other explosive devices
in El Salvador). In El Salvador, mines have been used by both parties to the conflict in
areas frequented by civilians. LAND MINES, supra, at 2. The armed forces in El Salva-
dor use mines defensively to protect emplacements and training camps. THE CIVILIAN
TOLL, supra note 34, at 106. The military also mine areas where guerrillas are ex-
pected to pass or camp. THE CIVILIAN TOLL, supra note 34, at 106. It appears, how-
ever, that the majority of civilian casualties in this area are caused by mines placed by
the FMLN guerrillas. THE CIVILIAN TOLL, supra note 34, at 106; LAND MINES, supra,
at 2.
In Nicaragua, both parties to the conflict use mines. LAND MINES, supra at 3. Min-
ing by the contras has caused the majority of civilian casualties in Nicaragua; however,
additional civilian casualties have occurred in Honduras as a result of Nicaraguan gov-
ernment mining. LAND MINES, supra, at 3. Land Mines summarizes this situation,
stating:
In sum, government and rebel forces in both El Salvador and Nicaragua have
used land mines indiscriminately; government forces of both countries have used
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the third paragraph of the United Nations Convention's preamble de-
clares that a basic purpose of this Convention and its Land Mines Pro-
tocol is to give effect to two fundamental customary principles of the
laws of war, namely, that the rights of the parties to an armed conflict
to adopt methods or means of warfare are not unlimited and the use of
weapons, projectiles, or material calculated to cause superfluous injury
or unnecessary suffering is prohibited.71 Another customary principle of
the laws of war - the protection of the civilian population against the
effects of hostilities - is recited in the Convention's second preambu-
latory paragraph.72 These principles of customary international law, as
previously indicated, are expressly recognized in United Nations Reso-
lution 2444. The inclusion of a de Martens Clause in the preamble of
the United Nations Convention also reaffirms the relevance of these
customary principles in all armed conflicts. 3
Furthermore, if the provisions of the Land Mines Protocol embody,
reaffirm, or implement these same principles, then states could regard
those provisions, independent of that instrument, as part of the custom-
ary laws of war. As such, these provisions could directly bind the par-
ties to internal armed conflicts. Accordingly, the following analysis of
the provisions of the Land Mines Protocol will focus on this inquiry.
A. PURPOSES AND DANGERS OF LAND MINE WARFARE
Unlike other international agreements that limit the use of specific
conventional weapons for the protection of both combatants and civil-
ians, the Land Mines Protocol seeks essentially to protect civilians7'
from the dangers of land mine warfare."' It does not protect military
personnel from the use of these and related devices and, furthermore,
land mines sporadically and rebel forces have used them extensively in both
countries; and the evidence suggests that the contras in Nicaragua probably have
used mines deliberately against civilians.
LAND MINES, supra, at 4.
71. U.N. Convention, supra note 67, preamble para. 3.
72. Id. preamble para. 2.
73. U.N. Convention, supra note 67, preamble; see also note 42 and accompanying
text (defining a de Martens Clause).
74. Carnahan, The Law of Mine Warfare: Protocol II to the United Nations Con-
vention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 105 MiL L. RE V. 73, 75 (1984).
75. Land Mines Protocol, supra note 9, art. I. Article I of the Land Mines Proto-
col limits the material scope of application of the Protocol to "the use on land of the
mines, booby-traps and other devices ... including mines laid to interdict beaches,
waterway crossings or river crossings, but does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines
at sea or in inland waterways." Id. The Protocol, therefore, does not affect existing
international laws governing mine warfare at sea. Id.
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permits the use of land mines to achieve military objectives."0
Certain peculiarities specific to land mines differentiate their use
from that of other conventional weapons." A United States expert on
the law of war notes in this regard:
Unlike ordinary munitions, land mines and booby-traps are not designed to
explode when they approach the target. They are, instead, designed to lie dor-
mant until enemy vehicles or personnel approach them. While most munitions
are intended primarily to destroy enemy property or personnel, land mines are, in
contrast, used primarily to impede enemy access to certain areas of land by re-
quiring mine clearance before those areas are used. Militarily, mine fields are
similar to ditches, tank traps, and concertina barbed wire in that they are obsta-
cles to enemy movement28
Thus, it is the particular area of land, rather than the vehicles or per-
sons entering it, that is the object of attack by mines. If an area of land
where mines are placed meets the test of a legitimate military objec-
tive, the deaths or injuries suffered by civilians as well as combatants
who enter that mine field are collateral or secondary to the primary
military purpose for the emplacement of the mines.h
Therefore, land mines pose two significant dangers particularly to ci-
vilians. First, a party to the conflict might place land mines in areas
populated by civilians. 80 Second, the land mines constitute a continuing
threat if they do not self-destruct, but remain active and in place after
their military purpose has ceased.81 The chief purpose of the Land
Mines Protocol is to shield civilians from these and other dangerous
effects of land mine warfare.82 The provisions of articles 2 and 3 of the
Land Mines Protocol implement this purpose in several ways. First,
they define terms necessary for clarifying the obligatory distinction be-
tween civilians and civilian objects and combatants and other military
objectives. Second, they impose legal restraints,8 3 namely a prohibition
of indiscriminate use 84 and the rule of proportionality, on land mine
attacks directed against military objectives.85 Third, they require par-
ties to take precautionary measures when using these weapons to avoid
or minimize civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects collateral
76. See id. art. 3(3).
77. Carnahan, supra note 74, at 75.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 76.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Land Mines Protocol, supra note 9, art. 2.
84. Id. art. 3(3).
85. Id. art. 3(3)(c).
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to attacks against military objectives." In addition, the provisions of
articles 4, 5, and 6 of the Land Mines Protocol detail other legal re-
strictions that vary with the type of mine or device.8
Before analyzing these articles, however, one should note that many
of their provisions reaffirm or directly incorporate rules and principles
found in comparable articles of Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions.88 Thus, authoritative interpretations of the articles contained in
Protocol I can provide relevant standards for interpreting and, possibly,
broadening the content of the articles contained in the Land Mines
Protocol. Further, to the extent that the provisions of Protocol I affirm
or embody customary rules of the laws of war applicable to all armed
conflicts, these provisions could be considered customary law. Accord-
ingly, comparable provisions in the Land Mines Protocol also could
constitute customary law and, therefore, are appropriate for applica-
tion, where relevant, to the internal armed conflicts in Nicaragua and
El Salvador.
B. GENERAL PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON WEAPON USE
The fundamental rule in the Land Mines Protocol that immunizes
civilians from direct attack is found in article 3(2). This article prohib-
its in all circumstances the "direct" use, "either in offense, defense or
by way of reprisals," of "land mines," "booby-traps," and "other de-
vices" against "the civilian population . . . or against individual civil-
ians."'8 9 Article 2 of the Protocol defines the terms "mines," "booby-
traps," and "other devices" as follows:
1. 'Mine' means any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other
surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity
or contact of a person or vehicle and 'remotely delivered mine' means any mine
so defined delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar or similar means or dropped from
an aircraft.
2. 'Booby-trap' means any device or material which is designed, constructed or
adapted to kill or injure civilians, civilian objects, and military objectives. 0
Although the Land Mines Protocol itself does not define the terms
86. Id. art. 3(4).
87. See id. art. 4(2) (placing restrictions on the use of mines, other than remotely
delivered mines, booby-traps, and other devices in populated areas); id. art. 5 (placing
restrictions on the use of remotely delivered mines); id. art. 6 (prohibiting the use of
certain booby-traps).
88. Carnahan, supra note 74, at 74 n.6 (stating that "delegates to the Weapons
Conference uniformly turned to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols
for definitions, terminology and basic principles of law").
89. Land Mines Protocol, supra note 9, art. 3(2).
90. Id. art 2.
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"civilian population" and "individual" civilians, article 50 of Protocol I
does define and explain the meaning of these terms.91 The same persons
should be regarded as civilians for purposes of the Land Mines Proto-
col. In addition, Protocol I and the Land Mines Protocol define the
term "civilian objects" identically as "all objects which are not military
objectives." By implication, therefore, the Land Mines Protocol consid-
ers all objects civilian in nature, unless they satisfy the twofold test for
military objectives. Furthermore, as already noted, article 52 of Proto-
col I creates a presumption that objects normally dedicated to civilian
use are not being employed to effectively contribute to military action.
The Land Mines Protocol, like Protocol I, defines military objectives
only as they relate to objects, rather than to personnel. It also does not
designate specific categories of property or persons as military objec-
tives.92 The objects defined in article 52 of Protocol I that would qual-
ify as military objectives should also qualify as such under the Land
Mines Protocol. In view of the fact that an area of land is the usual
object of a mine attack, such a land area also constitutes a legitimate
military objective under both Protocols. Finally, objects generally used
for civilian purposes that become a military objective also are amenable
to direct mine attack in accordance with other provisions of the Land
Mines Protocol.
C. PROHIBITION OF INDISCRIMINATE WEAPONS USE
Article 3(3) of the Land Mines Protocol states the rules for protect-
ing civilians and civilian objects from the collateral effects of land
mines that parties use against military objectives. This article prohibits
the "indiscriminate" use of these weapons that it defines as any place-
ment of such weapons
(a) which is not on, or directed at, a military objective; or
(b) which employs a method or means of delivery which
cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advan-
tage anticipated.93
91. Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 50.
92. Land Mines Protocol, supra note 9, art. 2(4); Protocol I, supra note 18, art.
52(2). Article 2(4) of the Land Mines Protocol and article 52(2) of Protocol I respec-
tively define "military objective" similarly as "any objective which by its nature, loca-
tion, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total
or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time
offers a definite military advantage."
93. Land Mines Protocol, supra note 9, art. 3.
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This definition adopts the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks
found in article 51(4) and (5) of Protocol I. Article 3(3) of the Land
Mines Protocol, like article 51(4) of Protocol I, does not prohibit all
land mine use that would strike military objectives and civilians or ci-
vilian objects without distinction, but only that use which subpara-
graphs (a), (b), and (c) specify.94 In this connection, the authors of the
New Rules note that the reference in article 51(4)(b) to "methods [of
attack] which cannot be directed at a specific military objective prohib-
its 'blind' weapons that cannot, with any reasonable assurance, be di-
rected against a military objective."" 5 Significantly, they state that
"[11and mines, laid without customary precautions, and which are un-
recorded, unmarked, or which are not designated to destroy themselves
within a reasonable time, may also be blind weapons in relation to
time." 96
Subparagraph 3(c) of article 3 expressly applies the principle of pro-
portionality to attacks against legitimate military targets in order to
protect civilians against their collateral effects. Thus, the use of land
mines against a military objective when the party may expect such use
to cause excessive civilian casualties and damages in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage would be a prohibited indis-
criminate use by definition. This express codification of the rule of pro-
portionality implements and clarifies the customary principle of hu-
manity that is applicable to internal armed conflicts and to which the
preamble of additional Protocol II alludes. 7
D. FEASIBLE PRECAUTIONS REQUIREMENT
Article 3(4) of the Land Mines Protocol requires that parties to a
conflict take all feasible precautions to protect civilians from the effects
of weapons. The article defines such precautions as those "which are
practicable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances
ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considera-
tions." ' This requirement, although not expressly clarified by exam-
ples, refers inferentially to customary principles of the laws of war that
require the attacking party to observe certain precautions when attack-
ing military objectives in order to avoid or minimize collateral civilian
casualties. It also refers to provisions in other articles of the Land
94. Id.
95. NEw RULES, supra note 20, at 305.
96. Id.
97. See Protocol II, supra note 8, preamble.
98. Land Mines Protocol, supra note 9, art. 3(4).
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Mines Protocol that call for actually warning the civilian population of
the deployment of land mines on or in an area containing a military
objective. This feasible precautions requirement, thus, complements the
obligation of the attacking party to respect the principle of distinction
set forth in article 3(2) of the Land Mines Protocol.
Article 57(2) of Protocol I contains a systematic codification of these
customary precautionary rules providing "combatants with uniformly
recognized guidance as to their responsibility to civilians and civilian
objects in carrying out attacks against military objectives." ' In this
regard, the authors of the New Rules note that article 57(a)
imposes three distinct duties on commanders who decide upon attacks and staff
officers who plan an attack: (1) verify that the target of an attack is a lawful
military objective, (2) avoid, or in any event, minimize civilian casualties, and
(3) ensure that any unavoidable civilian casualties are not excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 00
They add that in drafting subparagraph 2(a)(i) dealing with verifica-
tion of legitimate military targets and the rule of proportionality, "the
word 'feasible' . . . was preferred to 'reasonable' and that it is under-
stood to mean 'that which is practicable or practically possible.' "I01 In
99. NEw RULES, supra note 20, at 360; Protocol I, supra
note 18, art. 57(2).
100. NEw RULES, supra note 20, at 362. Article 57(2) states:
With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:
(a) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:
(i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked
are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to spe-
cial protection, but are military objectives within the meaning of
para. 2 of Art. 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of
this Protocol to attack them;
(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of
attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing,
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to ci-
vilian objects;
(iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.
(b) An attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the
objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, dam-
age to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
(c) Effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the
civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit.
Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 57(2).
101. NEw RULES, supra note 20, at 364; see id. at 363 (explaining that the obliga-
tion to do everything feasible includes a continuing obligation to collect, collate, evalu-
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fact, several delegations at the Conference expressed "understandings
to the effect that as used in Protocol I, 'feasible' means that which is
practical or practically possible taking into account all the circum-
stances at the time, including those relevant to the success of military
operations."'' 2 This is essentially the same terminology the Land Mines
Protocol uses to define "feasible precautions."
The obligations imposed on parties in article 57(2)(a) of Protocol I
to avoid collateral civilian casualties and, thus, to refrain from launch-
ing attacks that could do so reinforce the principle of proportionality
and the protection of the civilian population from the indiscriminate
use of land mines in article 3 of the Land Mines Protocol. °3 In addi-
tion to these precautionary measures, article 57(2)(b) requires an at-
tack to be suspended or cancelled if it becomes evident that the target
is not a military objective. This precaution is also appropriate to land
mine warfare because its observance is indispensable to compliance
with the requirement under article 3(a) that these weapons only be
used on or directed against military objectives.'" Finally, the following
discussion of specific restrictions on the use of different kinds of weap-
ons notes those measures necessary for warning civilians of the pres-
ence of land mines.
E. RESTRICTIONS ON NONREMOTELY DELIVERED LAND MINES,
BooBY-TRAPs AND OTHER DEVICES
Article 4(2) of the Land Mines Protocol prohibits the use of mines
which are not "remotely delivered," namely hand-delivered mines,
"booby-traps," and "other devices," in
any city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civil-
ians in which combat between ground forces is not taking place or does not ap-
pear to be imminent, unless either:
(a) they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective belonging
to or under the control of an adverse party, or
(b) measures are taken to protect civilians from their
effects, for example, the posting of warning signs, the posting of sentries, the
issue of warnings or the provision of fences."'
This prohibition does not extend, therefore, to any city, town, or vil-
lage where combat between ground forces is taking place or where such
combat appears imminent. Moreover, even if such combat were not oc-
ate, and disseminate timely target information).
102. Id. at 362.
103. Land Mines Protocol, supra note 9, art. 3.
104. Id. art. 3(a).
105. Id. art. 4(2).
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curring or imminent, these mines and other explosive weapons could,
nonetheless, be used "on or in the vicinity close to a military objective
belonging to or under the control of an adverse party."108 Burrus Car-
nahan writes that this particular exception "would, for example, permit
the destruction of an enemy military objective, located in a city, by a
commando force using demolition charges. Alternatively, the raiders
could lawfully place mines or booby-traps around the object to prevent
its use."107
In addition, parties can deploy these weapons in peaceable civilian
locales if "measures are taken to protect civilians from their effects, for
example, the posting of warnings or the provision of fences."108 Carna-
han notes that this language "requires that some measures be taken to
protect civilians, but does not guarantee the 'effectiveness' of the mea-
sures." 10 9 Although these exceptions largely obviate the basic prohibi-
tion against the deployment of these weapons in peaceable civilian con-
centrations, their permissible use under article 4 still remains subject to
the substantive restraints and prohibitions imposed on their use by arti-
cle 3 of the Protocol.
F. RESTRICTIONS ON REMOTELY DELIVERED MINES
Article 5 of the Land Mines Protocol establishes a special regime
regulating the use of remotely delivered mines.110 Article 2(1) defines a
106. Id.
107. Carnahan, supra note 74, at 81.
108. Land Mines Protocol, supra note 9, art. 4(2).
109. Carnahan, supra note 74, at 81. Government delegations to the Protocol con-
ferences "believed that guerrilla fighters could meet the requirements of [article
4(2)(b)] by orally informing the civilian population of the location of mines and booby
traps, without disclosing the location of these munitions to enemy troops." Id. at 81-82.
110. Land Mines Protocol, supra note 9, art. 5. Article 5 of the Land Mines Proto-
col states:
1. The use of remotely delivered mines is prohibited unless such mines are only
used within an area which is itself a military objective or which contains military
objectives, and unless:
(a) their location can be accurately recorded in accordance with Article
7(1)(a); or
(b) an effective neutralizing mechanism is used on each such mine, that is
to say, a self-actuating mechanism which is designed to render a mine
harmless or cause it to destroy itself when it is anticipated that the mine
will no longer serve the military purpose for which it was placed in posi-
tion, or a remotely-controlled mechanism which is designed to render
harmless or destroy a mine when the mine no longer serves the military
purpose for which it was placed in position.
2. Effective advance warning shall be given of any delivery or dropping of re-
motely delivered mines which may affect the civilian population, unless circum-
stances do not permit.
Id. art. 5(1), (2). Delayed action bombs may well come within the definition of re-
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remotely delivered mine as any mine "delivered by artillery, rocket,
mortar or similar means or dropped from an aircraft.""1
Article 5(1) prohibits the use of these mines except "within an area
which is itself a military objective or which contains military objec-
tives." Furthermore, parties cannot use them unless "their location can
be accurately recorded in accordance with" the Land Mines Protocol,
or unless each mine has a "self-actuating" or a "remotely-controlled"
mechanism that will render the mine harmless or cause its self-destruc-
tion when the mine no longer serves its intended military purpose. Par-
agraph 2 of article 5 imposes the additional requirement of effective
advance warning of any delivery or dropping of these mines that may
affect the civilian population. These restrictions are in addition to the
general restrictions and prohibitions enumerated in article 3 of the
Land Mines Protocol.1
The recording requirement alluded to in article 5 is stated in article
7(1)(a) of the Land Mines Protocol. The provision states that "[t]he
parties to a conflict shall record the location of . . . all pre-planned
mine fields laid by them."113 Although the Land Mines Protocol does
not define the term "preplanned," Carnahan notes:
Since 'preplanned' means more than 'planned,' a 'preplanned' minefield is, by its
nature, one for which a detailed military plan exists considerably in advance of
the proposed date of execution. Naturally, such a detailed military plan could
not exist for the vast majority of minefields placed during wartime. In the heat of
combat many minefields will be created to meet immediate battlefield contingen-
cies with little 'planning' or 'preplanning. '"'
The advance notification requirement in article 5(2) of the Land
Mines Protocol is a verbatim incorporation of article 57(2)(c) of Proto-
col I. This requirement reinforces the argument that the precautionary
rules contained in Protocol I can provide authoritative guidance for in-
terpreting the "feasible precautions" requirements of the Land Mines
motely delivered mines. Carnahan, supra note 74, at 79 n.29.
111. Land Mines Protocol, supra note 9, art. 2 para. I. The term "aircraft" in-
cludes "helicopters, drones, remotely-piloted vehicles and balloons." Carnahan, supra
note 74, at 79 n.29.
112. See generally Carnahan, supra note 74, at 79 (noting that given the rapidity
with which remotely delivered mines can be laid behind enemy lines, there were fears
that their indiscriminate emplacement could threaten the civilian population). There
was, therefore, "an express understanding that all the general restrictions on mine war-
fare in Article 3 also applied to remotely-delivered mines." Id. at 80.
113. Land Mines Protocol, supra note 9, art. 7(1)(a).
114. Carnahan, supra note 74, at 84. The recording requirement applies only to the
location of preplanned minefields, not to the location of individual mines therein, or to
the composition or configuration of the mines within the field. Id.
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Protocol. 1 5 Carnahan suggests that "among the 'circumstances' which
might not permit prior warning would be the necessity for tactical sur-
prise or guarding the safety of the aircraft dropping remotely delivered
mines."" 6
G. PARTICULAR RESTRICTIONS ON BOOBY-TRAPS
Article 2(2) of the Land Mines Protocol defines booby-traps as "any
device or material which is designed, constructed or adapted to kill or
injure and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or ap-
proaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe
act." ' 7 In addition to the general restrictions in articles 3 and 4 of the
Protocol, article 6 places specific prohibitions on the use of certain
booby-traps. For example, article 6(1)(a) prohibits the use of "any
booby-trap in the form of an apparently harmless portable object which
is specifically designed and constructed to contain explosive material
and to detonate when it is disturbed or approached."" 8 This rule for-
bids the use of mass-produced prefabricated booby-traps 19 as well as
remotely delivered booby-traps dropped en masse from aircraft.2 0 Par-
agraph 1(b) of article 6 prohibits booby-traps in any way attached to
or associated with:
(i) internationally recognized protective emblems, signs or signals;
(ii) sick, wounded or dead persons;
115. Id. at 80-81. Consequently, the Working Group on Land Mines drafted the
following nonbinding technical annex of recording guidelines that, if complied with,
will meet the recording obligations under Article 7:
Whenever an obligation for the recording of the location of minefields, mines,
and booby-traps arises under the Protocol, the following guidelines shall be taken
into account.
1. With regard to pre-planned minefields and large-scale and pre-planned use
of booby-traps:
(a) maps, diagrams or other records should be made in such a way as to
indicate the extent of the minefield or booby-trapped area; and
(b) the location of the minefield or booby-trapped area should be specified
by relation to the co-ordinates of a single reference point and by the esti-
mated dimensions of the area containing mines and booby-traps in relation
to that single reference point.
2. With regard to other minefields, mines and booby-traps laid or placed in
position:
In so far as possible, the relevant information specified in paragraph 1
above should be recorded so as to enable the areas containing minefields,
mines and booby-traps to be identified.
Id. at 84-85.
116. Id. at 80.
117. Land Mines Protocol, supra note 9, art. 2(2).
118. Id. art. 6(l)(a).
119. Carnahan, supra note 83, at 90 n.59.
120. Id. at 90 n.60.
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(iii) burial or cremation sites or graves;
(iv) medical facilities, medical equipment, medical supplies or medical
transportation;
(v) children's toys or other portable objects or products specially designed for the
feeding, health, hygiene, clothing or education of children;
(vi) food or drink;
(vii) kitchen utensils or appliances except in military establishments, military lo-
cations or military supply depots;
(viii) objects clearly of a religious nature;
(ix) historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the
cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples;
(x) animals or their carcasses."'
Although these prohibitions may appear unrelated, they share "a
common policy of reinforcing the respect and protection that interna-
tional law already accords to civilians, cultural property and the sick
and wounded. 1 2 2 For example, attaching these booby-traps to such ob-
jects would clearly violate the care and protection that the Geneva
Conventions, the two 1977 Protocols, and common article 3 guarantee
to the wounded and sick. Paragraph 1 of article 6 of the Land Mines
Protocol would also prohibit the use of these devices against or on med-
ical and religious personnel and on medical units and transports dis-
playing the Red Cross or the Red Crescent emblem. Moreover, booby-
trapping medical transports is tantamount to using them "to commit
hostile 'acts harmful to the enemy,' outside of their humanitarian func-
tion."123 Such actions would deprive these objects of their protection
under the Second Geneva Convention and both 1977 Protocols. 12'
Paragraph 1(b)(i) also reinforces the protection of the civilian popu-
lation from the catastrophic effects of warfare. This provision prohibits
the use of these devices in or on internationally recognized signs. 2
Thus, it would forbid the placement of booby-traps on dams, dikes, and
nuclear power stations entitled to be marked with "a special sign"
121. Land Mines Protocol, supra note 9, art. 6(l)(a).
122. Carnahan, supra note 74, at 91. For example, clauses (a)(i)-(iv) of article 6
"reinforce the respect which parties to the First Geneva Convention of 1949 owe to
medical personnel and the sick, wounded, or dead." Id.
123. Id. at 91.
124. Second Geneva Convention, supra note 5, art. 39; Protocol I, supra note 18,
art. 23; Protocol II, supra note 8, art. 11. Such conduct would violate the explicit
guarantee in common article 3 that "the wounded and sick shall be ... cared for."
1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 5, art. 3. Carnahan observes, regarding para-
graph (a)(i) of article 6, that "[t]he reference to objects using protective 'signals'
would apply ... to medical aircraft using radio or light signals as authorized by Arti-
cle 18 of the 1977 First Protocol." Carnahan, supra note 74, at 91.
125. Land Mines Protocol, supra note 9, art. 6(l)(b)(i).
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under article 56(7) and article 15 of Protocols I and II, respectively."'
Under both Protocols, these installations enjoy protections against at-
tacks that might release "dangerous forces" with consequent "severe
losses among the civilian population."12 This protection, however, does
not extend to attacks using antipersonnel weapons that could not re-
lease such forces. For example, under the circumstances, defenders
could use defensive mines and booby-traps against an infantry attack.
The prohibitions against booby-trapping articles ordinarily used by
civilians contained in paragraphs l(b)(v), (vi), and (x) also strengthen
existing legal restraints on means and methods of warfare designed to
protect civilians in all armed conflicts. 28 For example, the forbidden
use of these devices on "food or drink" or "animals" implements the
policy underlying article 14 of Protocol II that prohibits attacking or
destroying "foodstuffs" and "other objects indispensible to the survival
of the civilian population" for the specific purpose of denying
sustenance.1
29
H. OTHER RESTRICTIONS FOR SPECIALLY PROTECTED OBJECTS
El Salvador and Nicaragua are bound by other treaties to give spe-
cial protection to the cultural and religious objects mentioned in clauses
(viii) and (ix) of paragraph l(b), article 6 in the Land Mines Protocol.
Article 16 of Protocol II prohibits the parties to the Salvadoran conflict
from committing "any acts of hostility directed against historic monu-
ments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural
or spiritual heritage of peoples, and to use them in support of the mili-
tary effort."' 30 The New Rules states, however, that this effort must
meet the test for military objectives before a party can attack protected
objects.' 3'
126. Carnahan, supra note 74, at 93. Unlike article 56(7) of Protocol I, article 15
of Protocol II is silent on the use of the international sign for identification purposes.
According to the New Rules, however, the absence of an express provision does no
harm. "As there is no restriction on the use of the sign in peacetime, there can be no
objection to its use in time of internal armed conflict for the purpose of facilitating
recognition of protected status." NEw RULES, supra note 20, at 685.
127. Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 56(7); Protocol II, supra note 8, art. 15.
128. Although not defined in the Land Mines Protocol, articles 14 and 38 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention and article 77 of Protocol I refer to children "who have not
attained the age of fifteen years." Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 5, arts. 14,
38; Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 77. Inferentially, paragraph l(b)(v) of article 6 of
the Land Mines Protocol also applies to individuals under fifteen. Carnahan, supra
note 74, at 92.
129. Protocol II, supra note 8, art. 14.
130. Id. art. 16.
131. NEw RULES, supra note 20, at 333. The New Rules discusses the application
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The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
in the Event of Armed Conflict, 32 to which Nicaragua is a party, in-
corporates protections that the parties to the internal conflict in Nica-
ragua must accord these objects. 33 Article 19 of this Convention, like
common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, obligates each
party to a noninternational conflict to apply as a minimum, the provi-
sions of the Hague Convention that relate to respect for cultural prop-
erty.' In contrast to article 16 of Protocol II, however, which covers a
limited class of objects that are "part of the cultural and spiritual heri-
tage of mankind," 35 the 1954 Hague Convention requires the warring
factions in Nicaragua to give greater protection to a far broader scope
of cultural and artistic objects.' 38 Furthermore, the Hague Convention
of article 53, and inferentially, its analysis applies to article 16 of Protocol I1. Id.
132. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215, 240 [hereinafter Convention for the Protec-
tion of Cultural Property].
133. Id. art. 4. These obligations are stated in article 4 as follows:
1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect cultural property situated
within their own territory by refraining from any use of the property and its
immediate surroundings or of the appliances in the use for its protection for pur-
poses which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of
armed conflict and by refraining from any act of hostility directed against such
property.
2. The obligations mentioned in paragraph I of the present Article may be
waived only in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a
waiver.
3. The High Contracting Parties further undertake to prohibit, prevent, and, if
necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage, or misappropriation of, and
any acts of vandalism directed against, cultural property.
4. They shall refrain from any act directed by way of reprisals against cultural
property.
Id.
134. Id. art. 19; AMERICAS WATCH, PROTECTION OF THE WEAK AND UNARMED:
THE DISPUTE OVER COUNTING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN EL SALVADOR 30-45
(1984).
135. Protocol II, supra note 8, art. 16.
136. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, supra note 132, art. 1.
Under article 1 of the Convention, the term "cultural property" includes the following,
irrespective of origin or ownership:
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage
of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art of history, whether reli-
gious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are
of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books, and other ob-
jects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collec-
tions and important collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the
property defined above;
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the mov-
able cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as museums, large li-
braries and depositories of archives, and refuges intended to shelter, in the event
of armed conflict, the movable cultural property defined in subparagraph (a);
(c) centres containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in sub-
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prohibits reprisals in internal hostilities, whereas Protocol II does not.
Thus, the booby-trapping of cultural objects would violate the prohibi-
tion against their use for military purposes.
Article 6(2) of the Land Mines Protocol forbids the use of booby-
traps "designed to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffer-
ing."113 7 The unqualified application of this fundamental principle of the
law of war to booby-traps would clearly prohibit their use for this pur-
pose in all internal armed conflicts. 138 In addition, article 7(1)(6) re-
quires parties to a conflict to record the location of "all areas in which
they have made large-scale and preplanned use of booby-traps."13
It is apparent that the provisions of the Land Mines Protocol prohib-
iting both the direct use of these explosive weapons against the civilian
population and individual civilians and the indiscriminate use of these
weapons against military objectives reaffirm and implement the obliga-
tory rules stated in United Nations Resolution 2444, which is itself de-
claratory of existing customary laws of war applicable to internal
armed conflicts. These provisions, therefore, constitute legal obligations
binding on the parties to the internal hostilities in Nicaragua and El
Salvador. Furthermore, the express recognition of the principle of hu-
manity in the preamble of the United Nations Weapons Convention
also requires application of the principle of proportionality when using
these weapons against military objectives in internal armed conflicts.
VI. APPLICATION OF THE RELEVANT LAW TO THE
ARMED CONFLICTS IN NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR
Based on the preceding examination of relevant legal rules and prin-
ciples, one can make the following statements regarding application of
these rules and principles to the armed conflicts occurring in Nicaragua
and El Salvador.
I. Civilians.
The following persons in Nicaragua and El Salvador should be con-
sidered civilians and thus not be subjected to direct attack by combat-
ants or by land mines, booby-traps, and related devices:
A. The peaceful population not directly participating in hostilities.
B. 1. Persons providing only indirect support to the Salvadoran or
Nicaraguan armed forces by, inter alia, working in defense
paragraphs (a) and (b), to be known as "centres containing monuments."
Id.
137. Land Mines Protocol, supra note 9, art. 6(2); Carnahan, supra note 74, at 90.
138. See Carnahan, supra note 74, at 90.
139. Id. at 89.
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plants, distributing or storing military supplies behind conflict
areas, supplying labor and food, serving as messengers, or dis-
seminating propaganda. These persons may not be subject to
direct individualized attack because they pose no immediate
threat to the adversary. They assume, however, the risk of inci-
dental death or injury arising from attacks and the use of these
weapons against legitimate military targets.
2. Persons providing such indirect support to the contras in Nica-
ragua or to the FMLN rebels in El Salvador are clearly sub-
ject to prosecution under domestic laws of their respective
countries for giving aid and comfort to the enemy.
C. Persons, other than members of the parties's armed forces, who
do not actually take a direct part in the hostilities by trying to
kill, injure, or capture enemy combatants or to damage material.
These civilians, however, temporarily lose their immunity from
attack any time they assume a combatant's role. Included in this
category are armed civilian members of the Nicaraguan self-de-
fense groups who guard rural cooperatives, farms, and plants
against contra attack.
II. Civilian Objects
For purposes of both armed conflicts the following should be consid-
ered civilian objects immune from direct attack by combatants, as well
as by land mines, booby-traps, and related devices:
A. Structures and locales, such as houses, churches, dwellings,
schools, farm villages, and cooperatives, that in fact are exclu-
sively dedicated to civilian purposes and, in the circumstances
prevailing at the time, do not make an effective contribution to
military action.
B. In El Salvador, those historic monuments, works of art, or places
of worship constituting the cultural or spiritual heritage of peo-
ples, provided they are not used to support the enemy's military
effort.
C. In Nicaragua, those buildings, monuments and other objects de-
fined as "cultural property" by the 1954 Hague Convention for
the Protection of Cultural Property, provided that imperative mil-
itary necessity does not require waiver of their special protection.
III. Military Objectives.
While not an exhaustive list, the following persons, groups, and ob-
jects may be regarded as legitimate military objectives subject to direct
attack by combatants and those weapons specified in the Land Mines
Protocol:
A. In Nicaragua
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1. Members of the Popular Sandinista Army and Militias.
2. Members of contra groups, namely ARDE, FDN, KISAN,
and MISURASATA.
B. In El Salvador
1. Members of the Salvadoran combined armed forces and civil
defense forces.
2. Members of the FMLN.
C. In both countries, weapons, other war material, military works,
military and naval establishments, supplies, vehicles, camp sites,
fortifications, and fuel depots or stores, that are, or could be, uti-
lized by either party to the conflict.
D. In both countries, objects that, while not directly connected with
combat operations, effectively contribute to military operations in
the circumstances ruling at the time, such as transportation and
communication systems and facilities, airfields, ports, and other-
wise nonmilitary industries of importance to the ability of a party
to the conflict to conduct military operations, such as raw or
processed coffee in Nicaragua destined for export.
IV. Prohibited Attacks and Uses of Land Mines and Related Devices
Although not an all encompassing list, the following kinds of attacks
and uses of land mines, booby-traps, and related devices should be pro-
hibited in the conduct of hostilities in both countries:
A. Direct attacks, by ground or air, and direct use of these weapons
against individuals or groups of unarmed civilians where no legit-
imate military objective, such as enemy combatants or war mate-
rial, is present. Such attacks and uses of these weapons are
indiscriminate.
B. Direct attacks, by ground or air, and such direct weapons use
against civilian objects dedicated to civilian purposes, such as
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings, where no military objec-
tive is present. This type of attack and weapons use is similarly
indiscriminate.
C. Direct attacks, by ground or air, against unarmed civilians either
prior to, during, or immediately after their receipt of supplies es-
sential for survival, i.e., food and medicine, from relief societies.
Such attacks are also indiscriminate.
D. The use of any remotely delivered mine that is not effectively
marked and has no self-activating or remotely controlled mecha-
nism to cause destruction or neutralization of the mine once its
military purpose has been served. Such mines are "blind weap-
ons" and their use is indiscriminate in terms of time.
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E. The use of hand-delivered mines, such as those of the Claymore
variety, and booby-traps in or near a civilian locale containing
military objectives, if those devices are deployed without any
precautions, markings or other warnings or do not self-destruct
or are not removed after their military purpose has been served.
Such uses are also indiscriminate.
F. The use of mass produced, prefabricated booby-traps or re-
motely delivered booby-traps dropped en masse from aircraft.
G. The use of booby-traps in the guise of "letter bombs." Such a
use is indiscriminate.
H. The use of booby-traps designed to cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering, such as hidden pits containing poisoned
objects.
I. Direct attacks and use of booby-traps against medical and reli-
gious personnel, medical units and transports, particularly when
they are recognized as such by the display of the distinctive em-
blem of the Red Cross or Red Crescent.
J. The use of booby-traps either attached to or associated with:
1. sick, wounded, or dead persons including combatants who
are captured, surrendered or hors de combat;
2. burial or cremation sites or graves;
3. medical facilities, equipment, supplies, or transport;
4. articles ordinarily used by or for the care, hygiene, health, or
education of children under fifteen years of age;
5. food or drink, animals, or their carcasses.
K. The use of booby-traps:
1. to defend those dams, dikes, and nuclear power stations enti-
tled to be marked with internationally recognized signs;
2. in El Salvador, to protect those historic monuments, works of
art, or places of worship constituting the cultural or spiritual
heritage of peoples;
3. in Nicaragua, to protect those buildings, monuments and
other objects the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection
of Cultural Property defines as "cultural property."
V. Other Prohibited Practices
Again, while not an all-encompassing list, applicable international
law rules prohibit the following kinds of practices, orders, or action:
A. Orders to combatants that there shall be no survivors, such
threats to combatants, or direction to conduct hostilities on this
basis.
B. Attacks against combatants who are captured, surrender, or are
placed hors de combat.
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C. Use' of "blind" weapons that cannot be directed with any rea-
sonable assurance against a specific military objective.
D. Torture and other cruel treatment of persons under any circum-
stances.
E. The taking of hostages.
F. The infliction of humiliating or degrading treatment on civilians
or combatants who are captured, have surrendered, or are hors
de combat.
G. Assassination of civilian officials, such as judges or political
leaders.
H. The execution of civilians or combatants without previous and
proper trial by regularly constituted court.
VI. Classification of Civilian Casualties
A. The appropriate labeling of and attribution for the deaths of
civilians killed in military operations conducted by the warring
parties in El Salvador and Nicaragua depend on the circum-
stances of death. In both conflicts, the deaths and injuries to
civilians under the following circumstances may be properly
classified as homicides or felonious assaults attributable to the
responsible party to the conflict:
1. Death or injuries to civilians as a result of prohibited or in-
discriminate attacks or weapons use as indicated above.
2. Death to civilians as a result of summary execution or tor-
ture and injuries resulting from torture. In addition to violat-
ing international humanitarian law, such homicides and as-
saults, if attributable to members of El Salvador's or
Nicaragua's armed forces, would constitute human rights vi-
olations for which the perpetrator's government would be in-
ternationally responsible. 10 In contrast, the same acts, if
140. Both El Salvador and Nicaragua have ratified the American Convention on Human
Rights. American Convention on Human Rights, Treaty Series No. 36, OEA/ser. L/V/1l.23, doe.
2, rev. 6, O.A.S.O.R., OEA/ser. K/XVI/I.l, doe. 65 rev. 1, corr. 2 (Jan. 7, 1970), reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 673 (1970); see The American Convention on Human Rights: Signatures, Ratification,
Texts of the Instruments of Ratification and Adhesion, reprinted in OAS HANDBOOK OF EXISTING
RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS 83, 99, OAS doe. OEA/ser. L/V/II.65, doe. 6 (1985)
(listing the instruments of ratification of these countries). Both have also ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); see also Report of the Human Rights
Committee, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 98, 99, U.N. Doe. A/3840 (1983) (noting that El
Salvador and Nicaragua have ratified the Covenant). Because only states are proper parties to
these treaties and thereby bound to comply with the terms thereof, the governments of states alone
can be internationally responsible for the acts or omissions of its agents which violate the human
rights recognized in these instruments. Acts constituting homicides or assaults under applicable
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committed by members of the FMLN or contras, would not
be human rights violations, but rather are infractions of the
particular country's domestic laws. ""
B. Death or injury to civilians under the following circumstances
should be classified as legitimately combat related:
1. The deaths and injuries to civilians when they directly par-
ticipate in hostilities. Such persons forfeit their immunity
from direct attack.
2. The deaths and injuries to civilians who, because they are
near or located within a legitimate military objective, are
killed or injured as a result of direct attack or weapons use
against such objectives. Because such persons assume the
risk of death or injury arising from such attacks, their deaths
and injuries are collateral or incidental to the primary pur-
pose of these attacks.
Deaths resulting from situations in which attending circumstances
are unclear or unknown and proper attribution, consequently, is not
possible, fall within a "grey area" between these two extremes. These
deaths, therefore, must be excluded from the tallies of killings that are
regarded as homicides by international humanitarian law or human
rights law.
VII. CONCLUSION
Internal armed conflicts are historically among the bloodiest and
most cruelly fought wars. The conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua,
unfortunately, are not exceptions to this trend.
The minimum guarantees of common article 3 and customary princi-
humanitarian law could similarly violate comparable nonderogable rights in these human rights
treaties. Whereas the governments of El Salvador and Nicaragua have committed serious human
rights abuses, government and dissident forces in both countries have been guilty of Violating
international humanitarian law. THE CIVILIAN TOLL, supra note 34; AMERICAS WATCH. HUMAN
RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA 1986, (Feb. 1987); AMERICAS VATCH, HUMtAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA
1985-86, (Mar. 1986); WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, NICARAGUA. VIOLATIONS OF
THE LAWS OF WAR BY BOTH SIDES (1st Supp., Jan.-Mar. 1986); AIERICAS WATCII, VIOLATIONS
OF THE LAWS OF WAR BY BOTH SIDES IN NICARAGUA, 1981-85 (1st Supp., June 1985); D. Fox &
M. GLENNON, REPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP AND THE WASHING-
TON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA CONCERNING ABUSES AGAINST CIVILIANS BY COUNTERREVOLL -
TIONARIES OPERATING IN NICARAGUA (Apr. 1985); As BAD As EVER: A REPORT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR (4th Supp., Jan. 31, 1984); Am.IERICAS WATCH. REPORT ON HU&IAN
RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR (1982).
141. It is important to note that the same acts if committed in an international armed conflict
would constitute "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I and thereby subject
the perpetrator to prosecution for universal crimes within the jurisdiction of all state parties to
these treaties.
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ples of war codified in United Nations Resolution 2444, which consti-
tute part of the law governing both conflicts, purposefully seek to "hu-
manize" these conflicts for the benefit of civilians and combatants.
Many articles in Protocol I and Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions
implement this purpose by strengthening and clarifying both the princi-
ple of civilian immunity and the principle of distinction and by placing
legal restraints on methods and means of warfare. As general restate-
ments of these basic customary rules, these articles in the two Protocols
should also be regarded as customary law.
Additionally, many provisions of the Land Mines Protocol are pat-
terned on or directly incorporate the customary rules found in these
articles of Protocol I and Protocol II. Thus, the provisions of the Land
Mines Protocol that incorporate or reinforce these provisions of Proto-
col I and II should similarly be regarded as customary law and applied,
where appropriate, to the internal armed conflicts in El Salvador and
Nicaragua. Finally, to insure their compliance with those provisions of
the two 1977 Protocols and the Land Mines Protocol constituting cus-
tomary law, the parties to these Central American conflicts should re-
spect and implement other normative rules in these instruments in the
expectation that these rules will eventually become part of the custom-
ary laws of war. As the late Waldemar Solf wisely observed, "[s]ince
war, whether civil or international, is never viewed as a permanent con-
dition, compliance with the laws and customs of war facilitates the
eventual restoration of peace and helps heal the wounds of the
nation."142
142. Solf, Problems With the Application of Norms Governing Interstate Armed
Conflict to Non-International Armed Conflict, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 291, 293(1983).
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